# REGIONAL SUCCESS STORIES IN THE CONDITIONS OF WAR





Olena Kushnir - co-founder and CEO of the Ukrainian communications operator and universal integrator of IT solutions. "WEB PRO" LLC is an active participant of the Ukrainian telecommunication industry and a member of specialized assosiations.

- Chairmen of the Committee of Internet Resources Governance and Interaction with International Organizations at the Internet Association of Ukraine.
- Member of the Ukrainian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs
- Candidate for RIPE NCC Board Members,
   2023
- Adviser to the Deputy Minister of Digital Transformation of Ukraine.
- Co-organizer of the international conference Network Operators Group of Ukraine (NOGUA)



MISSILE ATTACKS

THE EXPERIENCE OF
UKRAINIAN SPECIALISTS IS
INCREASING EVERY DAY,
AND THE NETWORKS ARE
REACHING A NEW LEVEL OF
STABILITY.


DESTROYED INFRASTRUCTURE

**CYBER ATTACKS** 

DANGEROUS
WORKING
CONDITIONS


MOBILIZATION OF EMPLOYEES

THEFT OF UA
RESOURCES



#### Access to fixed Internet over 24 hours of blackouts


% of the total number of fixed Internet users






#### THE CITY OF KRAMATORSK, DONETSK REGION Chernihiv Чернігів о Korosten' Коростень Rivne Рівне Zhytomyr Житомир Kharkiv Харків Lviv Bila Tserkva Біла Церква Львів Poltava Ternopil O Cherkasy Черкаси Полтава Тернопіль Vinnytsia Вінниця Kremenchuk Ukraine o Ivano-Frankivsk Івано-Франківськ Кременчук Uman' o Kramatorsk Краматорськ Uzhhorod **Умань** Kropyvnytskyi Кропивницький Dnipro Ужгород Chernivtši-V Дніпро Donetsk Kryvyi Rih Кривий Pir Zaporizhzhia Запоріжи Rosto Mykolaiv şinău Melitopol' Миколаїв Odes 3mr







# STATISTICS OF CUSTOMERS



# DESTROYED INFRASTRUCTURE



Kharkiv region




Vinnytsia region



Kherson region

**ACCORDING TO THE WORLD** BANK, THE LOSSES OF THE **UKRAINIAN TELECOM SECTOR AMOUNT TO 2.5 BILLION DOLLARS** 



Engineers



DANGEROUS WORKING CONDITIONS

# Akhtyrsky district is still one of the most mined areas of the Sumy region

The car pulled over to the side of the road near the destroyed TV tower. There were four people in it. The driver died.





A LINK TO THE GOOGLE FOLDER WITH DESTROYED INFRASTRUCTURE





# DANGEROUS WORKING CONDITIONS





#### THEFT OF UA RESOURCES



In the last 12 months, more than 100 network registrations have moved out of Ukraine. More than 40 of these are now registered in Russia (Table 1).

24 February 2022	19 February 2023	24 February 2022	19 February 2023	24 February 2022	19 February 2023
UA 12959	RU 12959	UA 42301	RU 42301	UA 47379	RU 47379
UA 196705	RU 196705	UA 42393	RU 42393	UA 47939	RU 47939
UA 197129	RU 197129	UA 42394	RU 42394	UA 48711	RU 48711
UA 197880	RU 197880	UA 42511	RU 42511	UA 49075	RU 49075
UA 199908	RU 199908	UA 42518	RU 42518	UA 49536	RU 49536
UA 21087	RU 21087	UA 42534	RU 42534	UA 49803	RU 49803
UA 24758	RU 24758	UA 43564	RU 43564	UA 50210	RU 50210
UA 29031	RU 29031	UA 43802	RU 43802	UA 51153	RU 51153
UA 31387	RU 31387	UA 44240	RU 44240	UA 56676	RU 56676
UA 41039	RU 41039	UA 44269	RU 44269	UA 57093	RU 57093
UA 41082	RU 41082	UA 44584	RU 44584	UA 8381	RU 8381
UA 41308	RU 41308	UA 44857	RU 44857	UA 8654	RU 8654
UA 41479	RU 41479	UA 44878	RU 44878		
UA 41914	RU 41914	UA 47124	RU 47124		
UA 42104	RU 42104	UA 47243	RU 47243		

Table 1 — ASNs that were registered under Ukraine at the start of the war but, as of publishing, are registered in Russia.

Interestingly, the RIPE NCC transfer data shows that only the following five ASNs have been transferred in the last 12 months:

- AS12959 Anton Bobrovnikov Teleradiocompany Nadezhda Ltd 13/09/2022 POLICY
- AS210877 Towse'e Saman Information Technology Co. PJS TS Information Technology Limited 09/12/2022 POLICY
- AS41039 Timer, LLC LLC "FTICOM" 30/09/2022 POLICY
- AS44269 Informational-measuring systems Ltd. Electro-Communication Telecom Ltd 23/12/2022 POLICY
- AS198654 PEKITEL Ltd. Ltd. Alfa Telecom 31/01/2017 POLICY AS48654 RTK-centr ltd. Balnet Ltd. 08/03/2022 POLICY

Why all of the 43 ASNs mentioned in the table above are not shown in the RIPE NCC transfer data is not clear to me. It could be due to the NWI-10 policy, which updated the country codes in delegated statistics: perhaps these networks changed their addresses from Ukraine to Russia.





Figure 2 — Where ASNs allocated to Ukraine networks have been transferred since February 2022.

20



10

15

Czech Republic (CZ)

Canada CA) Bulgaria (BG)

Belgium (BE) Belarus (BY)

Belize (BZ)

Austria (AT)

 $Figure \ 7-Routes \ from \ AS35714 \ that \ appeared \ on the \ global \ routing \ table \ from \ November \ 2021 \ to \ January \ 2023. \ Source: RIPE \ AS35714 \ that \ appeared \ on the \ global \ routing \ table \ from \ November \ 2021 \ to \ January \ 2023. \ Source: RIPE \ AS35714 \ that \ appeared \ on the \ global \ routing \ table \ from \ November \ 2021 \ to \ January \ 2023. \ Source: RIPE \ AS35714 \ that \ appeared \ on the \ global \ routing \ table \ from \ November \ 2021 \ to \ January \ 2023. \ Source: RIPE \ AS35714 \ that \ appeared \ on the \ global \ routing \ table \ from \ November \ 2021 \ to \ January \ 2023. \ Source: RIPE \ AS35714 \ that \ appeared \ on the \ global \ routing \ appeared \ on the \ global \ routing \ appeared \ on the \ global \ routing \ appeared \ on the \ global \ routing \ appeared \ on the \ global \ on the \ global \ appeared \ on the \ global \ on the \ global \ appeared \ on the \ global \ on$ 



25

30

 $Figure\ 6-Routes\ from\ AS57864\ that\ appeared\ on\ the\ global\ routing\ table\ from\ November\ 2021\ to\ January\ 2023.$ Source: RIPE Stat.

Other large networks from the same region, such as AS57864 – MEGABIT and AS35714 – Infoservice-UA, also Aftab Siddiqui

23 February 2023 г.

#### THEFT OF UA RESOURCES



"THE RUSSIAN **GOVERNMENT WANTS** THE WORLD TO BELIEVE THESE INTERNET **SERVICE PROVIDERS ARE OPERATING ON RUSSIAN SOIL. CHANGING** THE REGISTRATIONS OF THESE IP RANGES TO **REFLECT THAT WORLDVIEW IS PART OF A** WIDER EFFORT OF THE **RUSSIFICATION OF CAPTURED UKRAINIAN TERRITORIES.**"




#### 23 February 2023 г.

For another example, take 151.0.0.0/20, which is originated by Online Technologies LTD (AS45025) in the Donetsk region. A change, highlighted below, on July 18th last year updated the country field from Ukraine to Russia.

```
$ whois --diff-versions 3:4 151.0.0.0 - 151.0.31.255
% Difference between version 3 and 4 of object "151.0.0.0 - 151.0.31.255"
00 - 3, 3 + 3, 3 00
                 Online Technologies LTD
 descr:
-country:
+country:
                 48.045955739960114 37.96531677246094
geoloc:
@@ -10,3 +10,3 @@
 created:
                 2012-01-05T13:39:09Z
-last-modified:
                2018-12-10T12:06:53Z
+last-modified:
                 2022-07-18T12:09:23Z
 source:
                 RIPE
```

In case there was any doubt about where this network is purportedly located, this registration entry helpfully contains <a href="lat./long">lat/long</a> coordinates which point to an address in Makiivka, just to the east of the city of Donetsk and the site of a deadly missile strike on New Year's Eve.



#### DIGITAL ANNEXATION



IN THE TEMPORARY OCCUPIED TERRITORIES THE OCCUPIERS STEAL IP-RESOURCES

#### STOLEN EQUIPMENT AND ISP COMPANIES' RESOURCES

IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES THE OCCUPIERS STEAL EQUIPMENT, OTHER COMPANY RESOURCES, AND COMPLETELY TAKE NETWORKS UNDER THEIR CONTROL.

#### **SWITCHING TRAFFIC ROUTING**

**BLOCKING UKRAINIAN RESOURCES.** 

OCCUPIERS FIRST OF ALL TURN OFF MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS FROM UKRAINIAN OPERATORS, AND ALSO SWITCH FIXED COMMUNICATION CHANNELS TO THE CRIMEAN OPERATOR MIRANDA. IN THIS WAY THEY TAKE FULL INFORMATIONAL CONTROL OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS WHO ARE UNDER OCCUPATION, SPREADING PROPAGANDA AND



### WHO HELPING US

























# PROGRAM COMMITEE



René Fichtmüller



Nataliia Klitna



Maksym Smilianets



Tetiana Popova



Oleksandr Glushchenko



Oleksandr Savchuk



Iryna Kabala




Mykola Kucheruk



Oleksandra Krovyakova












# OPENING THE FIRST











# MAIN GOALS: CHARITY AND AID FOR ISPs

ISP
FROM
FRONTLINE
AREAS

Free participation for visiting all conference official part and social events, hotel accommodation



5 Grants of 2,500 EUR each from both General Sponsor and general conference fund for ISPs

10%
FROM ALL
TICKET

Sent to general conference fund for aid for ISPs from frontline areas



7 certificates from Canadian donor each of 6,5 km of fiber optic cable







# NOGUA IN NUMBERS


150+ 30+ 90+

ONSITE PARTICIPANTS

ONLINE PARTIGIPANT

DIFFERENT COMPANIES

DIFFERENT COUNTRIES



#### Contacts







A LINK TO THE GOOGLE FOLDER
WITH DESTROYED
INFRASTRUCTURE

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THANK YOU FOR attention