A European House Divided Cannot Stand for Economic Revival & Security
The transfer of power within the European Union has been accomplished: a little less than half a year after the European elections of 9 June, the EU now has a new “College of Commissioners” headed once again by President Ursula von der Leyen (EPP). The new Finnish voice at the Commission table is Henna Virkkunen (EPP) who occupies the prominent role of Executive Vice-President for Tech Sovereignty. Extraordinarily, for the first time in the 21st century, none of the Commissioner-designates were rejected by the European Parliament.
Von der Leyen is now in the comfortable position that she can put her new political priorities into effect immediately. All in all, the EU thus appears to present a perfect image of stability – especially after a US Presidential Election that will usher in new uncertainty in global politics as of next year. Yet beneath the surface of this seemingly harmonious unity lurk cracks that could paralyse the EU in the months to come, with deleterious effects for European industry.
A Shaky Parliamentary Foundation for Von Der Leyen 2.0
That all is indeed not well within the EU becomes clear when looking at the voting results for the College of Commissioners – on 27 November, only 370 MEPs or 54% percent of the parliamentarians in attendance voted in favour of the von der Leyen Commission. This was not only down from the 401 MEPs who approved von der Leyen’s return to the Berlaymont in July, but the lowest vote share for a College of Commissioners in the Union’s history.
In part, this can be explained by specific dynamics in the Commissioner selection process such as the dislike of individual nominees. Yet the tighter than expected vote also reflects the parliament’s resentment over the balance of power between the EU institutions that the last months revealed: while the European Parliament emerges from this transition divided and with a diminished role, the national governments and Ursula von der Leyen have asserted their dominance.
A Social Democrat Gamble That Backfired
At the heart of this power shift arguably stands a political miscalculation by the European social democrats. Despite losing the centre-left majority that had dominated the first von der Leyen Commission, the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) believed that they could play an outsized role in setting the parliamentary agenda. In their eyes, the European People’s Party (EPP) would be dependent on them to install the new Commission and pass key legislation.
However, S&D thus underestimated the readiness of the EPP to rely on majorities with the right, namely the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and the far-right Patriots for Europe (PfE). While refusing to formally talk with the PfE, EPP leader Manfred Weber made it clear at an early stage that his group would put policy before political coalitions. This was seen most notably when the EPP passed significant proposals for a revision of the EU Deforestation Regulation with votes from the ECR and PfE. Most significantly, Weber refused to join the S&D Group’s blockade of the Italian and Hungarian Commissioner-designates, Raffaele Fitto (ECR) and Oliver Várhelyi (PfE).
This stand-off could still have played out in favour of the social democrats, if they had secured the backing of centre-left national leaders – except that they did not. According to press reports, the Spanish social democrat Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez (PES) eventually instructed his fellow Spaniard, S&D leader Iratxe García Pérez, to end the blockade and approve the Commission as a whole – including Fitto and Várhelyi. In doing so, Sánchez not only dealt a severe blow to the European social democrats’ morale but reasserted the dominance of the Council over the European Parliament as a whole and provided Ursula von der Leyen with the triumph of gaining her ideal College of Commissioners.
The Risk of European Deadlock
This ultimately swift and clear agreement is not a guarantee of stability, however: temporarily, the EPP has the luxury to side with whichever side of the parliament it needs. If it does so too liberally though, it risks facing its own strategic dilemma very soon. The social democrats may thus wholly refuse cooperation with the EPP, while the Patriots for Europe may insist that the centre-right officially negotiates with them in return for their votes – which is a non-starter for the EPP, not least as it would cause a split in their own ranks. In the most extreme scenario, the splits between the political groups could risk hamstringing the EU’s functioning in the longer term. Since the Council and the Commission cannot pass legislation without the European Parliament, permanent dysfunction within the Union’s elected chamber would, therefore, inevitably spread to the entire EU.
EPP leader Manfred Weber appears to recognise that he cannot afford to permanently alienate the progressive side of the parliament: in his plenary speech of 27 November, he struck a notably conciliatory tone towards the social democrats. At the same time, he will likely hope that the social democrats understood the signal he was sending to them: namely, that the S&D Group could not impose their will on the EPP but needs to actively seek mutually agreeable compromises with them on policy.
The volatility within the European Parliament does not bode well for industry. It cannot be ruled out that the divisions created by the past weeks harden and effectively block the passage of crucial policy initiatives needed to secure the prosperity and resilience of Europe – be it simplification of regulation, defence initiatives, or the deepening of the Single Market. The next weeks and months will show if MEPs can bury the hatchet and work constructively together, aware of the colossal responsibility before them – or if this is the beginning of what may become one of the most unpredictable European Parliaments in the Union’s history, marked by deadlock and strife.
Lisätietoja
